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Striving for group agency: threat to
personal control increases the
attractiveness of agentic groups
Janine Stollberg*, Immo Fritsche and Anna Bäcker
Department of Social Psychology, Institute of Psychology, University of Leipzig, Leipzig, Germany
When their sense of personal control is threatened people try to restore perceived control
through the social self. We propose that it is the perceived agency of ingroups that
provides the self with a sense of control. In three experiments, we for the first time
tested the hypothesis that threat to personal control increases the attractiveness of
being part or joining those groups that are perceived as coherent entities engaging in
coordinated group goal pursuit (agentic groups) but not of those groups whose agency
is perceived to be low. Consistent with this hypothesis we found in Study 1 (N = 93) that
threat to personal control increased ingroup identification only with task groups, but not
with less agentic types of ingroups that were made salient simultaneously. Furthermore,
personal control threat increased a sense of collective control and support within the task
group, mediated through task-group identification (indirect effects). Turning to groups
people are not (yet) part of, Study 2 (N = 47) showed that personal control threat
increased relative attractiveness ratings of small groups as possible future ingroups only
when the relative agency of small groups was perceived to be high. Perceived group
homogeneity or social power did not moderate the effect. Study 3 (N = 78) replicated the
moderating role of perceived group agency for attractiveness ratings of entitative groups,
whereas perceived group status did not moderate the effect. These findings extend
previous research on group-based control, showing that perceived agency accounts for
group-based responses to threatened control.
Keywords: social identity, control motivation, responses to threat, agency, group processes
Introduction
Group membership is important to people. It helps them to define who they are and to whom they
belong, and it serves the satisfaction of basic human needs. The link between group membership
and need satisfaction has been delineated for different motives, like self-esteem (Tajfel and Turner,
1979; Rubin andHewstone, 1998), belongingness (Baumeister and Leary, 1995; Hornsey and Jetten,
2004), self-concept certainty (Jetten et al., 2004; Hogg, 2007), symbolic immortality (Greenberg
et al., 1986; Castano et al., 2002), and, more recently, for personal control (Fritsche et al., 2013).
Although, the need for control has been counted among the most basic human motives (Fiske,
2003; Pittman and Zeigler, 2007) only recently empirical research has begun to systematically test
how group membership may satisfy the need for control (Fritsche et al., 2008, 2011, 2013). People
need a general sense of control (White, 1959), they want to experience themselves as autonomous
agents who are capable to exert influence on important aspects of their environment. We propose
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that a feeling of “having an impact on the world” is not limited to
individuals (“I have an impact on”), but can be extended to social
ingroups (“We have an impact on”), and that both contribute to
the perception of the self as an agent. Accordingly, people can
rely on their group membership to perceive themselves as agents
when their sense of personal control is threatened (Fritsche et al.,
2013). Building on research showing increased identification
and group-based cognition following threat to personal control
(Fritsche et al., 2008, 2013; Agroskin and Jonas, 2010, 2013), in
the present article we aim at investigating what kind of groups
work best for restoring a sense of control. Specifically, we tested
the novel hypothesis that when a sense of personal control is
threatened, people identify more strongly with agentic ingroups
and find it more attractive to join agentic than less agentic groups.
People usually belong to many different groups that represent
their social self (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). They identify with
ingroups that are both accessible and salient in a particular
context (Turner et al., 1987), and which may satisfy important
self-related motives (Correll and Park, 2005). The need for
control has been referred to as one of the most central human
motives (White, 1959; Pittman and Zeigler, 2007). Deprivation
of control can impair people’s performance, well-being and
health (Szpiler and Epstein, 1976; Rodin and Langer, 1977;
Abramson et al., 1978), which is why people strive to uphold
or restore a sense of control when control seems threatened
(Rothbaum et al., 1982; Thompson et al., 1993). The model
of group-based control (Fritsche et al., 2011, 2013) assumes
that defining the self in terms of group membership (social
identity; Tajfel and Turner, 1979) and joining in group-based
action bolsters or restores people’s sense of control through the
(social) self when their sense of personal control is threatened.
Initial empirical evidence has supported the group-based control
approach: Salient lack of personal control increased ingroup bias
(Fritsche et al., 2008, 2013), the expression of prejudice (Agroskin
and Jonas, 2013; Fritsche et al., 2013; Greenaway et al., 2014a)
and conformity to salient ingroup (but not to outgroup) norms
(Stollberg et al., Unpublished manuscript). The reported control
threat effects were obtained for different ingroups, ranging from
classic social categories like nationality, and students, to work
groups. However, it is an open question, whether people deprived
of personal control support and identify with any ingroup. The
model of group-based control suggests that people prefer groups
that appear as (collective) agents and that could equip the self
with a sense of (collective) control. This novel hypothesis is
tested in the present research for both, identification with present
ingroups and perceived attractiveness of joining new groups.
What are the properties of groups that give people a sense of
collective control? According to Skinner (1996), personal control
comprises the idea that the self as an agent can affect end states
through instrumental actions (means). In a related vein, Preston
and Wegner (2005) proposed that people are motivated to think
of themselves as agents (“ideal agency”). According to them,
agency is experienced for voluntary actions and can be traced
back to three features: an intention to act, the free will to exert the
action, and performing the action itself. The concept of agency
closely resembles and helps to specify the foundations of control.
Thus, drawing on both Skinner, and Preston and Wegner, we
define a sense of control as the perceived potential to affect
important aspects of the environment through the autonomous self.
That is, perceptions of agency are essential for perceiving control,
and striving for perceptions of the self as agentic should be a
means to (re-) establish a perception of control.
Building on social identity principles (Tajfel and Turner,
1979), we propose that perceptions of agency are not limited to
the personal level of the self, but can also describe the social level
of the self. That is, in situations where the personal self is salient,
people infer control from their sense of personal agency, whereas
when a social self is salient, people’s sense of control should be
determined by perceptions of collective agency. In cases when
personal agency and control seem thwarted, people may thus be
motivated to define the self in terms of an agentic ingroup or to
become amember of an agentic group. Applying the components
of personal agency specified by Preston and Wegner (2005) to
a collective agent (i.e., a social group) means that, for instance,
a group of colleagues voluntarily cleaning up a messy meeting
room would be perceived as agentic, because they are actually
cleaning (perform action), they have planned to do so (collective
intention), because they were annoyed by all the mess (free will).
If people are motivated to reestablish a sense of control and to
perceive themselves as autonomous collective agents, they should
prefer groups that best represent all features of an ideal agent.
First evidence that groups differ with regard to how well they
satisfy agency needs was reported in research on lay people’s
group typologies (Lickel et al., 2000), showing that only task
groups were associated with agency (Johnson et al., 2006). In a
similar vein, Deaux et al. (1995) found that vocational identities
were seen as more agentic than other identities.
Entitativity—the perception of a group as a real entity
(Campbell, 1958; Yzerbyt et al., 2000; Brewer et al., 2004)—
should be a necessary precondition to ascribe perceptions of
agency to a group. Entitativity was linked to various group
properties, such as boundedness, common fate, similarity of
group behavior, homogeneity of group members, and sharedness
of goals (Yzerbyt et al., 2000; Brewer et al., 2004). However,
in most empirical studies, entitativity was understood only in
terms of group homogeneity (Yzerbyt et al., 2000; Castano et al.,
2003; Hogg et al., 2007) or within-group similarities (Lickel et al.,
2000; Johnson et al., 2006; Crawford and Salaman, 2012). It
was shown that identification with homogenous and bounded
groups increased following self-uncertainty (Hogg et al., 2007),
supporting the notion that groups with clearly defined prototypes
satisfy a need for self-certainty. However, entitativity (i.e., the
perception of a group as coherent entity through a certain
level of homogeneity and boundedness among group members)
should not be sufficient for satisfying the need for control,
although it might be a necessary condition for group-based
control to emerge. First, individuals require a certain level of
similarity and boundedness to be perceived as a group at all.
Second, basic agreement on collective goals and representations
of the environment seems necessary to engage in collective
behavior (which is not true for unspecific homogeneity that is
not related to group goals). Nevertheless, whether or not the
group is pursuing goals and has formed them autonomously
is independent of perceived consensus and thus entitativity,
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but it is basically a question of collective agency. Although,
some authors included agency in the concept of entitativity
(Brewer et al., 2004), for the sake of clarity, here we treat both
concepts separately, proposing that entitativity is necessary but
not sufficient for group-based control to emerge. We hypothesize
that threat to control increases identification with ingroups and
increases the attractiveness of new groups, when these groups are
highly entitative and at the same time highly agentic. Further, we
control for other group features that may be related to collective
agency, such as group size, group power, or status to flesh
out the unique effect of collective agency for increasing group
identification and group selection under threat.
To test our hypothesis that threat to control increases the
attractiveness of agentic groups we conducted three studies.
In Study 1, we investigated the effect of a control salience
manipulation on identification with different types of ingroups,
intimacy groups, task groups, social categories and loose
associations. We hypothesized that control threat increases
identification only for those types of groups that are characterized
by both entitativity and agency (i.e., task groups; Lickel
et al., 2000). Moreover, we investigated whether increased
group identification following threat indirectly strengthened
perceptions of intragroup support and collective control.
According to the model of group-based control (Fritsche et al.,
2011, 2013), when people respond to threatened control through
identification with agentic ingroups they should perceive an
increase in perceived control through the (social) self, that
is, on the group level. Perceptions of heightened collective
efficacy and perceived support within the ingroup should thus
be indicative of control experienced on a group level. In
line with this assumption Drury and Reicher (2009) found
that identification with a social movement increased group
members’ perceptions of empowerment and collective efficacy,
and therefore maintained the belief that the ingroup can attain
its goal collectively.
In Studies 2 and 3, we studied the attractiveness of groups
that were not (yet) a part of participants’ identity. In particular,
in Study 2 we were interested in the factors that determine
the attractiveness of small vs. large groups. Small groups have
been associated with better group performance due to less
procedural losses on coordination (Kravitz and Martin, 1986),
and motivation, like social loafing (Latané, 1981), which might
affect the efficacy of group goal pursuit and increases the
perception of small groups as agentic and efficacious, as it has
been found in social dilemma studies (Kerr, 1989). However,
there is contrary evidence as well: participants, who were asked
to interact with others as a representative of a majority group
reported a higher sense of personal control than those who
thought to represent a minority group (Guinote et al., 2006).
Finally, the relation between size and group agency perceptions
was questioned in a multilevel-analysis by Watson et al. (2001),
who investigated the impact of several individual and group
factors on collective efficacy beliefs and who did not find a
relation between group size and collective efficacy beliefs of
group members. The ambiguity of these results suggests that
whether small or large groups are perceived as more agentic
may vary from situation to situation. We hypothesized that
following threat to personal control participants should be more
strongly attracted to groups of that size they perceive as relatively
more agentic. Other perceived group characteristics that do not
represent full-blown agency, such as social power or unspecific
homogeneity, are not expected tomoderate the effects of personal
control threat on relative group attractiveness.
In Study 3, we measured the three components of perceived
ideal group agency for entitative and non-entitative groups,
hypothesizing that control threat affects group attractiveness only
when the group is entitative and highly agentic. Following a
control salience manipulation, we assessed the attractiveness of
entitative and non-entitative realistic groups that were displayed
on pictures and measured perceived agency and perceived group
status as possible moderators.
Study 1
We conducted Study 1 to examine the effect of threatened control
on identification with ingroups of different types. As we argued
above, not all groups should restore a sense of control to the same
degree. Those high in both, entitativity and agency should be
preferred when people have the opportunity to choose between
ingroups of different types. A taxonomy of group types published
by Lickel et al. (2001) reflects the intuitive typing of groups by lay
people. They differentiate between task groups (e.g., work teams),
intimacy groups (e.g., families), social categories (e.g., nations)
and loose associations (e.g., people waiting together at the bus
stop), showing that these four group types provide different
benefits for people: participants primed with adjectives linked
to a need for affiliation (e.g., connectedness, belonging) listed
significantly more intimacy groups, whereas for achievement
related adjectives (e.g., success, competence) more task groups
were selected, and for self-esteem related adjectives (e.g., identity,
distinctiveness) more social categories were chosen (Johnson
et al., 2006; Crawford and Salaman, 2012). None of the studies
investigating need fulfillment by these four different group types
has explicitly investigated a need for control as a driver of ingroup
identification. However, it seems obvious that task groups are
those that are most intimately associated with the notion of
agency and therefore collective control as, unlike the other
groups, it is their most primary purpose to act. Therefore, we
expect an increase in identification following threat to control
only for task groups, because these groups are primarily perceived
as agentic groups.
In line with the notion of group-based control, increased
identification with a task ingroup following threat to control
should further result in increased perceptions of collective
efficacy and within-group support. Collective efficacy directly
expresses a sense of collective control and agency whereas
within-group support facilitates effective group coordination
and goal pursuit and may thus indicate collective control
in an indirect fashion. Recent findings initially support this
assumption, by showing that group identification increased
people’s perceptions of control, which in turn enhanced personal
well-being (Greenaway et al., 2015). Thus, we tested for indirect
effects of control threat on collective efficacy and within-group
support, mediated via identification with task groups.
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Method
Participants and Design
One hundred and one university students participated in the
study.We excluded three participants who had guessed the aim of
the study, and five who had participated in a similar experiment
previously. Thus, the final sample consisted of 93 participants,
66 were female and 26 were male, with a mean age of 21.41
years (SD = 2.22), one person did not indicate age or sex. The
experiment had a 2 Control Salience (high/low) × 4 Group
Identification (task group/intimacy group/social category/loose
association) design with repeated measurement on the last factor.
Procedure
Participants were recruited at the campus of a German university.
After they had agreed upon participation, they received a
questionnaire, which introduced the study as a survey on
personality traits. Then, participants were exposed to a control
salience manipulation, similar to a manipulation that has
been used previously in control threat research (Whitson
and Galinsky, 2008). In the low control salience condition,
participants read the following instruction (instructions for the
high control salience condition in parentheses): Please think
about an important situation in your life, in which you had no
(full) control over the things going on. Please, try to remember
exactly and imagine the event vividly! How did you feel right
now? Now, describe the situation and your thoughts about it in
the following lines. Please, take as much time as necessary!
The control manipulation was followed by a German version
of the PANAS (Watson et al., 1988) and a questionnaire on
sleep- and awakening patterns, which served as a delay task.
We included a delay task, because different kinds of threat
have been shown to produce effects only after a short delay
(Wichman et al., 2008; Burke et al., 2010; Fritsche et al.,
2012). Afterwards, participants received descriptions of the four
group types (task group, intimacy group, social category, loose
association) according to Lickel et al. (2000). For each group
type they were asked to identify an example group to which they
belonged. Then, identification with the group, collective efficacy,
and within-group support were assessed. The order in which the
group types were presented was counterbalanced, resulting in
four different versions of the questionnaire.
Identification
Participants rated their identification with each group on five
items on a 4-point-scale (1 = do not agree to 4 = agree). Four
were adopted from Henry et al. (1999): “I think of this group
as part of who I am.”, “I see myself as quite similar to other
members of the group.”, “I enjoy interacting with the members of
this group.”, “Members of this group like one another.”, another
item “I am happy to be a member of this group.” was added,
α(task group) = 0.83, α(intimacy group) = 0.53, α(social category) = 0.71,
and α(loose association) = 0.86
1.
1Participants rated each group on warmth (warm, good-natured) and
competence (competent, intelligent). Ratings were not affected by control
salience manipulation, all F ’s < 1. As we did not expect any difference on these
dimensions, we did not consider it further.
Collective efficacy
Then, participants completed four items (1 = do not agree
to 4 = agree), assessing collective efficacy beliefs for each
group: “Together we are strong.”, “We can achieve things
collectively, one cannot achieve individually.”, “Nobody should
think you cannot count on us.”, “Together we even come through
hard times.”, α(task group) = 0.82, α(intimacy group) = 0.61,
α(social category) = 0.79, and α(loose association) = 0.87.
Within-group support
Perceived support among group members was assessed with
three items (1 = do not agree to 4 = agree) for each
group, adapted from Zimet et al. (1988): “There is always a
member of the group around when I am in need.”, “I get
the emotional support and help I need from my group.”, “I
can count on my group when things go wrong.”α(task group) =
0.80, α(intimacy group) = 0.77, α(social category) = 0.87, and
α(loose association) = 0.84. After completing the experiment,
participants were debriefed and thanked for participation and
received a chocolate bar.
Results
We expected low control salience to increase identification with
the task group, but not with other group types. Therefore,
we conducted a 2 Control Salience (low/high) × Order of
Group Types × 4 Group Identification (task group/intimacy
group/social category/loose association) analysis of variance,
with repeated measurement on the last factor (for cell values
see Table 1). The general level of group identification differed
marginally for the order of group type presentation, F(3, 78) =
2.62, p = 0.06, η2 = 0.09. However, as it did not interact with
control salience, we report the descriptive values of the analysis
regardless of presentation order. The results showed different
levels of identification, depending on group type, F(3, 78) =
334.29, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.93. Participants reported the
highest level of identification with intimacy groups, followed
by social categories and task groups, with the lowest levels
of identification with loose associations. More importantly, a
significant interaction of control salience and group type suggests
that control salience affected participants’ identification with
ingroups differently, depending on group type, F(3, 78) = 3.18,
p = 0.03, η2 = 0.11. In line with predictions, people with
low perceptions of control reported higher levels of identification
with the task group than people with high perceptions of control,
F(1, 80) = 6.12, p = 0.02, η
2
= 0.07. There were no simple effects
of control salience on identification with intimacy groups, social
categories or loose associations, all p’s> 0.12.
Mediational Analyses
To test whether increased identification with a task group
mediates the effect of control salience on collective efficacy beliefs
and perceived within-group support from the task group, we
conducted two separate simplemediation analyses (see Figure 1),
using the macro process for SPSS (Hayes, 2013). Control salience
was contrast coded for both analyses (low control = −1 vs. high
control = 1). Participants in the low control salient condition
showed more identification with their task group as participants
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TABLE 1 | Mean and standard deviation scores for identification with
different group types as a function of control salience (Study 1).
Identification
Task Intimacy Social Loose
group group category association
M SD M SD M SD M SD
Low control
salient
2.75 0.61 3.74 0.29 2.65 0.53 1.81 0.76
High control
salient
2.46 0.69 3.83 0.21 2.67 0.58 1.66 0.55
FIGURE 1 | Indirect effects of control threat in Study 1: Task group
identification mediates the effect of control threat on both, perceived
within-group support and collective efficacy perceptions. Control
salience was contrast coded: Low control (−1), high control (+1).
in the high control salient condition (a = −0.15, p = 0.02),
as identification increased in participants, collective efficacy
beliefs increased too (b = 0.56, p < 0.001). A bias-corrected
95% confidence interval based on 2000 bootstrap samples for
the indirect effect (ab = −0.09) was entirely below zero, CI
[−0.18,−0.02], indicating an indirect effect. No evidence was
found for a direct effect of control salience on collective efficacy
beliefs (c′ = 0.05, p = 0.44).
Simple mediation analysis for within-group support revealed
that low control salience increased participants identification
with their task group as compared to high control salience
(a= −0.15, p = 0.02), as identification increased, perceived
group support increased too (b = 0.79, p < 0.001). Again, a
bias-corrected 95% confidence interval (2000 bootstrap samples)
for the indirect effect (ab = −0.12) was entirely below zero,
CI [−0.23, −0.01]. No direct effect was found, (c’ = 0.09, p =
0.15). Both reported mediations support our prediction that
control threat indirectly increased collective efficacy beliefs, as
well as perceived within-group support, via increased task group
identification. As the control salience manipulation did not affect
identification with another group type, we tested, whether there
was a direct effect of control salience on collective efficacy beliefs
and within-group support for the other group types. No direct
effect could be observed for any of the two dependent measures,
all p’s> 0.21.
Discussion
The results show that threat to personal control increased people’s
reports of identification with self-representative task groups,
but not with other types of ingroups. This means that people
under threat either identified more with task groups or more
often choose task groups (but not other types of groups) they
strongly identified with. Both possible processes express their
motivation to uniquely associate the self with an ingroup, whose
primary purpose is the active pursuit of a shared goal, as well
as the perception to achieve the goal through joint effort, and
therefore agency (Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2007). Identification
with other groups that were also high on entitativity (Lickel
et al., 2001), but rather low on agency, such as intimacy groups,
was not affected by control threat. This supports our contention
that only membership in entitative groups that at the same
time is characterized by agency can restore feelings of perceived
control through the collective self. Entitativity per se is not
sufficient to increase the self-importance of a group following
threat to control when more than one group is salient to people.
While people identified highest with intimacy groups, which
is in line with previous findings (Castano et al., 2003), self-
importance of intimacy groups did not increase for people
low in control, suggesting a specific mechanism of group-based
control restoration. Nevertheless, previous studies also found
increased support of other ingroups, such as nations, following
threat to control (Fritsche et al., 2013). This could be explained
by the fact that in all of these studies only one ingroup was
salient to participants and thus only one option for experiencing
collective control, whereas in the current study participants could
choose that ingroup that appeared to be most appropriate for
reestablishing a sense of control. Although in general, groups
should heuristically be perceived as homogeneous agents (Brewer
et al., 2004), the present study made salient the differences
between the group types. Obviously, as the current results show,
some ingroups are better suited to restore control perceptions
than others, probably because they can provide a greater sense
of agency.
The control restorative function of task ingroups is further
supported by mediational evidence. The results show, as
their sense of personal control decreased, people increased
identification with a task group they belonged to, which in
turn enhanced perceptions of collective efficacy for the task
group. The same was true for perceived support among group
members. Although, support by others may indicate less control
through the self in interpersonal contexts, salient common
group membership is likely to transform interpersonal support
into an expression of the agentic “We,” and thus represents
an indirect indicator of collective control. Hence, we conclude
that people increase perceptions of collective control through
identification with agentic ingroups, when control perceptions
for the personal self are depleted. These findings illustrate that
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ingroup identification can in fact restore perceptions of control
and may thus add to research examining beneficial effects of
social identity for human well-being (social cure effects; Jetten
et al., 2014).
However, agency is not the only characteristic of task groups
and thus the effects of salient threat to personal control may
be attributed to processes other than group-based control. To
solve this issue, we conducted Studies 2 and 3, where we directly
tested whether perceived group agency is necessary for increased
group attractiveness following threatened personal control2. In
Studies 2 and 3, we also intended to contrast the proposed
moderating effect of perceived collective agency to the effects
of other potential moderators, thereby turning from ingroup
identification to the attractiveness of groups people do not (yet)
belong. Here, we assume that potential new members become
more likely to join the group when they perceive features of
the group satisfying their personal needs (Moreland and Levine,
1982). Therefore, threat to personal control should increase the
attractiveness of groups that are perceived as being agentic.
Study 2
The results of Study 1 are a first indication that agentic ingroups
are especially attractive for people who lack personal control.
In Study 2 we extend this hypothesis to potential ingroups of
which people are not part of yet. Furthermore, to test whether
the effect of perceived collective agency is unique, possible effects
of other factors, such as group size, perceived group power or
perceived unspecific group homogeneity should be teased apart
from agency perceptions.
In Study 2, we investigated the impact of control threat on
attractiveness of groups differing in size. Small groups are better
able to act in a coordinated manner, whereas in cases where large
groups solve their coordination problems, as majority groups,
they will have more social power to attain resources and could
thus elicit effects on the environment. As thus, small and large
groups’ agency may be in the eye of the beholder, we decided
to use relative measures, assessing participants’ idiosyncratic
perceptions of how agentic large groups are in comparison to
small groups. In addition, we measured participants’ relative
perceptions of large vs. small groups on the possible group
attribute moderators power and homogeneity, as well as group
attractiveness as dependent variable. We expected participants
to respond to threatened personal control by showing a relative
preference for groups of that size they perceive as relatively
more agentic. Although both group power and homogeneity
could be related to perceptions of collective agency, they are
each insufficient to cover all aspects of agency. Power can refer
to personal influence, but also to the possession of resources
2In the present study, however, we did not expect a moderation of the control
threat effect by the measure of task group efficacy on identification. This is because
we explicitly contrasted task groups with group types of lower agency that should
have led to decreased variance on people’s perceptions of task groups’ agency
(contrasted to the other groups, task groups are clearly agentic). Variance on
perceived task group efficacy should have been primarily caused by the indirect
effect of threat through task group identification instead, which appeared to
represent a process of group-based control restoration.
and high status. Only the former perception shows a conceptual
association with the outcome aspect of agency but less so with its
process (shared intention and coordinated collective action). In a
similar vein, homogeneity may prepare the ground for building
shared intentions but is not implying that coordinated action
or visible outcomes do occur. That is why we only expected
full-blown agency to moderate control threat effects on group
attractiveness.
Method
Participants and Design
Fifty university students participated in the study. We excluded
one participant who had guessed the aim of the study, and two
participants who participated in a similar experiment previously,
resulting in a final sample of 47 participants. Twenty participants
were female, and 27 were male, with a mean age of M = 27.81
years (SD= 7.95). A manipulation of control salience (high/low)
served as independent variable. For both, dependent variable
and moderators, we used measures that assessed participants’
relative perceptions of large vs. small groups. We tested relative
group agency, power, and group member homogeneity of large
vs. small groups as a function of control threat on relative group
attractiveness ratings.
Procedure
Participants were asked at the campus of a German university
to take part in a study on attitudes, biorhythm and personality.
After they had agreed upon participation, they received
a questionnaire, which opened with a control salience
manipulation similar to those used in Study 1. In the low
control salience condition (high control salience in parentheses)
they read: Take a moment to think about situations or incidents,
in which you realized that you have very little (very much) control
and impact on important things in your life. Please describe briefly
in your own words one event or situation that made you feel
helpless (influential). How did you feel in that situation? After
answering the two questions, participants were asked to indicate
on a 7-point-scale (1 = not at all to 7 = very much), how much
they felt in control over important aspects in their life in the
situation they had just described, which served as a manipulation
check. This was followed by a questionnaire on sleep- and
awakening patterns, which served as a delay task, as in Study 1.
Group attractiveness
Then, participants made attractiveness rating for six pairs
of groups, representing environmental organizations, political
parties, companies, aid agencies, and cliques, that were each
briefly described. Within one pair, the group descriptions
differed only in group size (one small group, one large group).
Participants were instructed to imagine that both groups would
equally correspond to their attitudes and beliefs and that they
should make a decision, which group they would rather like to
join. To avoid a forced choice task, participants made ratings for
each group of the pair with regard to the likelihood that they
would join the group on a 7-point-scales (1= very unlikely to 7=
very likely). To preserve the comparative nature of the judgments,
we computed a difference score for the dependent variable of
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group attractiveness ratings, subtracting ratings of small groups
from ratings of large groups, resulting in a variable that reflected
the relative attractiveness of large compared to small groups.
Group attributes
Group attributes were assessed as relative measures, too.
After group attractiveness ratings, participants were asked to
indicate, which attributes large groups possess as compared to
small groups: “Large groups are rather. . . ” (1 = powerless to
7= powerful); “Members of large groups are rather. . . ” (1 =
dissimilar to 7 = similar); “Large groups are rather. . . ” (1 =
non-agentic to 7 = agentic). After finishing the experiment,
participants were thanked, fully debriefed and received a
chocolate bar for their participation.
Results
Participants in the low control salience condition indicated
having perceived less control over important aspects in their life
(M = 2.19, SD = 1.33) than participants in the high control
salience condition (M = 5.40, SD = 1.24), t(34) = −7.34, p <
0.001. Thus, the manipulation of control salience was successful.
We tested whether control threat would increase relative
preference for the group size that participants saw as relatively
more agentic. For participants who saw large groups as more
agentic than small groups, we predicted that the control threat
would increase their relative preference for large groups. For
participants who saw small groups as more agentic than large
groups, we predicted the reverse, that control threat would
increase their relative preference for small groups. Thus, we
predicted a crossover interaction. We tested for moderation by
perceived relative agency of large groups, using the processmacro
for SPSS by Hayes (2013). We regressed relative attractiveness of
large vs. small groups on control salience (contrast coded with:
high = 1, low = −1), perceived relative agency, and the Control
Salience × Agency interaction. Agency and the interaction term
were mean centered. The results showed that perceived agency
moderated the effect of control salience on perceived relative
attractiveness, indicated by a significant Control Salience ×
Agency interaction, b = −0.20, t(44) = −1.81, p = 0.08
(see Figure 2). As simple slope analysis showed, when large
groups were perceived as less agentic than small groups (−1
SD), the relative attractiveness of small groups increased under
low control salience compared to high control salience, b =
0.45, t(44) = 1.89, p = 0.07. No effect of control salience on
relative attractiveness could be observed, when large groups were
perceived as more agentic than small groups (+1 SD), b= −0.16,
t(44) = −0.68, p = 0.50. Looked at differently, participants in the
low control salience condition perceived large groups as relatively
more attractive than small groups, when large groups were
perceived as more agentic (+1 SD), than when large compared
to small groups were perceived as rather non-agentic (−1 SD),
b = 0.55, t(44) = 3.60, p < 0.001. In the high control salience
condition, no effect occurred, b = 0.15, t(44) = 0.92, p= 0.36.
We conducted another regression analysis, including all
possible moderators (agency, power, and homogeneity), as well
as the interaction terms of Control Salience × Agency, Control
Salience × Homogeneity, and Control Salience × Power, to test
FIGURE 2 | Relative attractiveness of large groups compared to small
groups (difference score) as a function of control salience (low vs.
high) and relative agency perception of large vs. small groups. Agency
plotted at +1 SD (high agency large groups), and −1 SD (high agency small
groups) about the mean (Study 2).
for all moderators simultaneously. No moderation was found for
power or homogeneity, p’s> 0.38.The initial interaction effect of
Control Salience × Agency and the pattern of results remained
the same.
Discussion
The results of Study 2 confirm our hypothesis that agency, and
not perceived power or group member homogeneity, moderates
the effect of control salience on perceived attractiveness of
potential ingroups. Threat to control increased the relative
attractiveness of small groups when these were perceived as
more agentic than large groups. For people with low perceptions
of control, attractiveness of small compared to large groups
was higher, when they perceived small groups to be relatively
more agentic than large groups. However, control threat did not
increase preference for large groups, when large groups were
perceived as relatively more agentic than small groups. Perceived
group power and member homogeneity did not moderate the
control salience effect on group attractiveness. These findings
emphasize the importance of agency as the crucial group feature
that defines whether groups can serve as a resource for personal
control.
Moreover, the results of the study provide first evidence that
control threat can affect the choice of group membership. This
could offer new insights, why some groups become attractive for
people with low control perception and others do not. Although,
perceived group power did not elevate control threat effects on
group attractiveness, it is possible that groups high in power
offer more opportunities to their members to perceive control
than their low power counterparts. Power has been defined in
terms of dependence, as an asymmetrical control over resources
(e.g., Dépret and Fiske, 1999), but it has been also defined
in terms of agency, as exerting control over the environment
(van Dijke and Poppe, 2006). In intergroup research, collective
action, the coordinated, voluntary action on behalf of the group,
has been referred to as the basis for group power (Turner,
2005). This distinction between resource control and agency
definitions of power may help to understand why perceived
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power is not related to control perceptions, as it seemed to be
in the present study, and sometimes it is related to perceptions
of control (Guinote et al., 2006). When groups are perceived as
powerful due to agency reasons, they should have the potential
to provide members with a sense of control. However, power due
to disposability of resources does not necessarily imply that the
group has acquired the resources through collective effort (high
status groups often obtain resources because they are entitled
but not because they have invested high effort) or that they apply
these resources for common goal pursuit. Therefore, controlling
resources does not necessarily express collective agency but may
sometimes even indicate passivity (“being served”). This would
support the finding from interpersonal power research that
people often strive for personal power, which reflects the desire
to increase one’s sense of agency, but less so for social power,
which reflects the desire to have control over others (van Dijke
and Poppe, 2006).
Study 3
In Study 2 perceived agency determined the effect of control
threat on attractiveness ratings, however, as we used a global
measure of agency, we were not able to assess whether all
components of agency were present. It is possible that people
indeed infer agency, but inference should be stronger when
more components are present (Preston and Wegner, 2005). In
Study 3 we thus used a more elaborated measure of collective
agency perceptions, covering collective intention (cf. shared
goals) and voluntary and active collective goal pursuit that
represent important indicators of agency (Preston and Wegner,
2005). By employing realistic pictures of entitative and non-
entitative groups we thought to use a more subtle procedure to
present group features to participants. Groups were preselected
as entitative or non-entitative, that means, the degree to which
they were perceived to form a coherent entity (“groupness”).
This allowed us to test directly our assumption that entitativity
is necessary for perceptions of collective control, but that it
is not sufficient to explain control threat effects on group
attractiveness ratings. We expected personal control threat to
increase attractiveness ratings of entitative and agentic groups,
whereas attractiveness of groups that lack either entitativity or
agency should not be affected by control threat.
Moreover, we tested whether the proposed effect of personal
control threat on the evaluation of agentic groups is independent
of the social status participants ascribe to the groups. This
enabled us to test whether the effect is specific to processes
of group-based control, which would imply a moderation
by perceived agency but no parallel moderation by status.
Alternatively, a moderation by status that cancels out the
moderation by perceived agency would suggest a self-esteem
account of the personal control salience effect, assuming that
people strive for collective status in order to satisfy self-esteem
needs (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Rubin and Hewstone, 1998).
Method
Participants and Design
Eighty university students participated in the study, two
participants were excluded from the sample, one guessed the
aim of the study, and one participated in a similar experiment
previously. Thus, the final sample consisted of 78 participants,
43 were female and 35 were male, with a mean age of 23.44
years (SD= 4.50). A manipulation of personal control salience
(high/low) served as independent variable.
Procedure
Participants recruited at the university campus, were asked
to take part in a study on personality traits and group
perceptions. After participants had agreed upon participation,
they received the questionnaire first containing a control salience
manipulation, that has been previously used in group-based
control research (Fritsche et al., 2013). Participants in the low
control salience condition (high control salience in parentheses)
read: Take some moments to think of those aspects of your life,
that give you a sense of helplessness and lacking impact (power
and impact) on the important things of your life. Please, briefly
jot down in your own words those three aspects of your life that
make you feel most helpless (powerful)3. As in Studies 1 and 2,
this was followed by a delay task, the German version of the
PANAS. Then, participants were presented with 12 pictures of
an aggregate of people, six pictures depicted people forming an
entitative group, whereas six other pictures depicted people in
a similar context who did not form an entitative group (see
Supplementary Material). The pictures were selected from a Pre-
Study (N = 40), where we asked participants to estimate the
degree to which the people displayed in the pictures constituted
a real entity. The people in the entitative group pictures that we
used in this study were perceived significantly more as a coherent
entity than the people in the non-entitative pictures, F(1, 39) =
179.30, p < 0.001. We told participants to imagine that they
would like to start a similar group as it was depicted in the picture
with people they like. We did so to ensure that participants
perceived all groups as potential future ingroups. The pictures
differed with regard to content, representing typical groups of the
daily life. They displayed people in a seminar room, people in the
streets of a city, people painting an artwork, people in an office
room, people in a park, and people fishing. Then participants
should rate each of the depicted groups on attractiveness of the
group for the self, perceived agency, likeability of depicted group
members, and perceived status.
Group attractiveness
Participants rated the attractiveness of the group for the self on
four items: “I find the group attractive,” “I can nicely imagine
myself being a part of a similar group,” “I think, the group
members feel comfortable with their group,” “I would found a
similar groupmyself.” Ratings were made on a 7-point-scale (1=
not at all to 7= absolutely). Internal consistency of attractiveness
ratings for each group ranged from α = 0.75 to α = 0.92.
Group ratings were averaged over six pictures each, to build two
composite score of general group attractiveness, one for entitative
3Please note, that the term “power” is used here as a synonym for “effectance” or
“control” as it explicitly refers to objects of control that are not necessarily social.
In German language the use of the word “power” [Macht] is not limited to social
subjects, but can be used for non-social objects either. We used it in the present
manipulation as in German everyday language the term “control” is not clearly
associated with effectance.
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and one for non-entitative groups, which served as dependent
variables.
Group agency
We created a five item measure of perceived agency to assess the
three components of agency as we initially defined it: Sharedness
of a common goal, voluntary group coordination to achieve the
goal, and active pursuit of the goal. Items were: “The people
in the group have a common goal that they are able to attain,”
“I think, it is likely that the group will reach their common
goal,” “The group is pursuing its goal collectively,” “The people in
the group are actively working together,” “The group acts rather
passively.”(reverse coded). Ratings were made on a 7-point-scale
(1 = not at all to 7 = absolutely), internal consistency was good
for all groups, ranging from α = 0.80 to α = 0.90, except for
one group depicting people in a seminar room, with an internal
consistency of α = 0.65. Again, ratings were averaged over six
groups each, resulting in perceived agency of entitative groups
and perceived agency of non-entitative groups.
Group status
Group status was measured with one item, on a 7-point-scale
(1= not at all to 7= absolutely): “The group gives the impression
of being held in high esteem.”, and averaged for entitative groups,
α = 0.73, and non-entitative groups, α = 0.65.
Personal likeability
Further, we assessed perceived personal likeability of the
individuals depicted in the pictures with one item (“The people
in the group look sympathetic”). We intended to make sure
that the depicted individuals did not a priori differ on personal
likeability. As likeability ratings for people in entitative and non-
entitative groups pictures did not differ for participants with low
as compared to high perceptions of control, p = 0.32, we did
not consider likeability in any further analysis. After finishing
the experiment, participants were thanked, fully debriefed and
received a chocolate bar for their participation.
Results
We expected low control salience to increase the attractiveness of
entitative groups that at the same time are perceived as highly
agentic. Thus, we conducted a moderation analysis, using the
process macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2013). As control threat may
affect attractiveness of entitative groups, depending on perceived
group status, we tested for both moderations simultaneously
(Model 2). Attractiveness of entitative groups was regressed on
control salience (low = −1, high = +1), perceived agency of
entitative groups, perceived status of entitative groups, Control
Salience × Agency, and Control Salience × Status. Agency and
Status, as well as both interaction terms weremean centered prior
to the analysis. The results showed the predicted moderation
for perceived agency, b = −0.23, t(76) = −2.47, p = 0.02,
and as expected no moderation for perceived status, b =
0.07, t(76) = 1.08, p = 0.29. Simple slope analysis revealed
that participants with low perceptions of control find entitative
groups more attractive than participants with high perceptions of
control, when they perceived the groups as very agentic (+1 SD),
b= −0.28, t(76) = −3.13, p = 0.003. When entitative groups
were perceived as less agentic (−1 SD), attractiveness ratings were
not affected by control perceptions, b = 0.05, t(76) = 0.51,
p = 0.62 (see Figure 3). Looked at differently, when low control
was salient, very agentic groups were more attractive than less
agentic groups, b = 0.59, t(76) = 4.67, p< 0.001, whereas agency
perceptions were not related to attractiveness ratings when high
control was salient, b = 0.19, t(76) = 1.45, p = 0.15. Thus, the
results fully supported our hypothesis.
We conducted the same moderation analysis for non-
entitative groups. Attractiveness of non-entitative groups was
neither affected directly by control salience, nor did perceived
agency or perceived status moderate the effect, all p’s> 0.41.
Discussion
The results of Study 3 further support our hypothesis that threat
to control increases the attractiveness of groups that are perceived
as both coherent entities and as highly agentic. Low control
salience increased attractiveness ratings of entitative groups,
when these groups were perceived as highly agentic. Of interest,
perceived status did not moderate control threat effects on
attractiveness ratings. Although, it should be acknowledged that,
for economical reasons, we assessed group status with a single
item measure, the results support our contention that perceived
collective agency but not collective status accounts for the effects
of personal control threat on group-based cognition and action.
This enables us to distinguish processes of group-based control
from processes of self-esteem maintenance, which should both
represent central functions fulfilled by group membership.
General Discussion
Across three studies, we found converging evidence that threat to
control increases the attractiveness of groups that are perceived
as agentic, indicating that people try to restore and maintain
their sense of control on the social level of the self when
control is threatened for the personal self. Study 1 shows that
threat to personal control increased identification only with
task groups, but not with intimacy groups, social categories
FIGURE 3 | Attractiveness ratings of entitative groups as a function of
control salience (low vs. high) and agency perceptions (plotted at +/−
1 SD about the mean). Results are controlled for perceived group status
(Study 3).
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or loose associations. This supports our assumption that some
groups are better suited to fulfill a need for control than
others: when multiple ingroups are salient in a situation, people
respond to control threat by increasing identification only with
those groups that are both highly entitative and agentic (i.e.,
task groups). Entitativity in terms of “groupness” seems to
be a necessary but not sufficient condition for group-based
control as intimacy groups that are usually perceived as high
in entitativity (Lickel et al., 2000) were not affected by control
threat. Study 2 yielded more specific evidence that agency is the
crucial group feature making groups attractive for group-based
control restoration. Salient threat to personal control increased
the relative attractiveness of small vs. large groups only when
small groups were perceived as relatively more agentic than
large groups. Other group features, such as perceived group
power and perceived ingroup homogeneity did not moderate
the effect of threatened control on group attractiveness ratings.
This provides specific evidence for the moderating role of
agency perceptions. Although, homogeneity and power may
relate to specific components of agency perceptions they cannot
be equated with agency. While similarity among group members
may facilitate the generation of a shared group goal that increases
agency perceptions, it does not imply joint goal pursuit and
action. In a similar vein, group power usually allows for more
opportunities and access to resources that could be used for
effective goal pursuit, but powerful groups do not necessarily
engage in goal achievement, because they might be satisfied with
their current situation and behave rather passively. In Study 3, we
conceptually replicated that perceived group agency moderates
control threat effects on group attractiveness. Threat to control
increased attractiveness ratings of entitative (but not of non-
entitative) groups, when these were perceived as highly agentic,
that is, when the groups were perceived as collectively and
actively pursuing a common goal. Moreover, perceived group
status did not moderate control threat effects on attractiveness
ratings. The mere perception of high status or majority status
(which is often used as a proxy for a high status group), is not
sufficient to attract people with a deprived sense of control.
The present findings support the novel hypothesis derived
from the model of group-based control (Fritsche et al., 2011,
2013), that people seek out for membership in and identification
with agentic groups to restore a sense of control. Group
membership satisfies different kinds of needs, but it is perceived
collective agency that accounts for group-based control. Other
group characteristics like homogeneity, power or group status
did not affect group attractiveness ratings for control deprived
people. Therefore, our findings extend previous research showing
correlational evidence for differential need satisfaction by
different groups (Johnson et al., 2006; Crawford and Salaman,
2012). They are also in line with research that considers the
ingroup as a social resource (Correll and Park, 2005) for satisfying
different needs, such as needs for certainty (Hogg, 2007), self-
esteem (Rubin and Hewstone, 1998), and control (Fritsche et al.,
2008). While, for instance, ingroup homogeneity can serve
best a need for self-certainty (Hogg, 2007) or distinctiveness
(Brewer, 1991; Jetten et al., 2004), perceived agency is crucial
for control restoration. This adds to research showing that
group features like agency or homogeneity are empirically related
but functionally different constructs (Spencer-Rodgers et al.,
2007; Crump et al., 2010). Whereas, entitativity understood
in terms of groupness and homogeneity moderates the effect
of a self-uncertainty threat on group identification (Hogg
et al., 2007), our findings show that although entitativity seems
necessary for group-based control, control deprived people only
increase identification with those groups that are additionally
perceived as agentic. Further research could investigate this more
directly by manipulating group entitativity and group agency as
independent between-subjects factors.
Although, the present findings support the notion that
different threats elicit different reactions, they could also be
understood in terms of a general threat and defense model (Jonas
et al., 2014). This model assumes that threat causes amotivational
discrepancy that could be resolved by approach-oriented
reactions on the personal or social level. Increased attraction to
ingroups following control threat represents such a distal defense
mechanism on the social level. The present results showing
identification with and attraction to agentic groups following
threat support the notion that switching from behavioral
inhibition to behavioral activation describes the threat defense
process (Greenaway et al., 2014b). Future research should clarify
the conditions under which people get to behavioral activation
and regain a sense of agency and control either by engaging in
personal or in social responses. The present research on group-
based control indicates that threat influences social interactions
on the group level as it determines people’s sense of whom they
belong and which groups they seek to join or to found.
People Increase Perceptions of Collective
Control Following Personal Threat Through
Identification with Agentic Ingroups
Further evidence for the mechanism of group-based control
comes from mediational analyses of Study 1. These findings are
the first to show indirect effects of personal control threat on
collective control through ingroup identification. This supports
the assumption of group-based control that people can restore
feelings of control through group membership. Although,
previous research has demonstrated increased collective
reactions to control threat (Fritsche et al., 2013), evidence
that collective reactions in turn increase a sense of collective
control has not been shown yet. Further, mediational evidence
points to the specific benefits group membership has for people
deprived of personal control: low personal control increased
perceived social support by group members, mediated via
ingroup identification. This complements research investigating
the curative potential of social groups and the effects of ingroup
identification on health and well-being (Haslam et al., 2009;
Jetten et al., 2014). Previous findings showed the beneficial
effects of identification on well-being following rejection and
therefore threat to self-esteem (Branscombe et al., 1999) and the
stress reducing effect of ingroup identification through perceived
ingroup support (Haslam et al., 2009). More recently, Greenaway
et al. (2015) found that perceived personal control mediated
the beneficial effects of ingroup identification on personal
well-being. The present findings support a control path on which
the curative function of ingroup identification can unfold. They
show that control threat enhances identification with agentic
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groups that in turn alleviate control loss: membership in agentic
groups can help to restore and defend a threatened sense of
control by providing group members with sense of collective
control.
Limitations
In the present research, we compared a control threat salience
condition with a condition in which high personal control was
salient, without employing a neutral condition. Hence, it is
possible that attractiveness of agentic groups does not increase
following control threat, but decrease following control salience.
However, we assumed the control threat condition to drive the
effects, because in previous research control threat effects on
ingroup defense emerged as compared to both, a high control
condition and a neutral (i.e., dental pain) condition (Fritsche
et al., 2008). No differences were observed between high control
and the neutral topic. Nevertheless, future research would benefit
from including a neutral condition to distinguish the control
threat effects from possible effects of boosted control.
Implications for Collective Action and
Attractiveness of Social Movements
The finding that collective agency is the crucial feature that
increases group attractiveness for people with low perceptions
of personal control could help to explain why some groups gain
members and support in society in times of threat and crisis
while other groups do not (Fritsche et al., 2011). As perceived
collective agency seems to restore a sense of control in people
that are personally affected by societal crises, those groups that
allow for perceptions of collective agency should gain most.
Social movement organizations (Stürmer and Simon, 2004), such
as gay-rights organizations or pro-environmental action groups
are among those groups that are intimately associated with
collective agency as they are set up for mastering collective
tasks (i.e., they are true task groups). However, societal crises
may also give rise to destructive forces and radicalized groups
that become attractive for control deprived people when these
groups unite against a common enemy thereby demonstrating
collective agency through zealous protests or even violent actions.
Summed up, there is reason to believe that, beyond perceptions of
collective threat or disadvantage (van Zomeren and Iyer, 2009),
collective action participation might be fertilized by threat to
people’s personal sense of control.
The possibility of increased collective action under conditions
of threatened control shows that mechanisms of group-based
control might be adaptive for resolving personal helplessness.
This perspective adds to other recent research on social responses
to control threat (Kay et al., 2008, 2009). Kay et al. (2008) have
proposed that instead of trying to regain control through the
(social) self, people may respond to threatened personal control
by supporting external agents of control, such as God or the
national government, and attributing control over bad outcomes
to powerful enemies (Sullivan et al., 2010). This is thought to
prevent a sense of randomness and lacking structure as external
agents impose their order on the world. However, the present
findings indicate that although personally helpless, people may
first check out possibilities of extending the self to an agentic
social ingroup that restores a sense of control through the self
(primary control; Rothbaum et al., 1982) before they resort
to external agents to preserve perceptions of order (secondary
control; Rothbaum et al., 1982).
Our findings further imply which group people prefer when
different groups are available. For control-deprived individuals
groups focusing on similarity and similar appearance and less
on coordinative effort in goal attainment, seem not to be first
choice, if other groups exist that appear highly agentic. A group
with a certain lifestyle, such as bohemianism, might be attractive
to people because of the shared idea to live for art and love
in an unorthodox, impoverished and unconventional manner,
but that group will probably not be known for its agency,
and might be therefore not primary for experiencing collective
control. Instead, a successful political action group that actively
fights for its goals may provide collective agency to potential
members. This implies that the attractiveness of groups for new
members could be emphasized by indications of agency. Groups
that engage in collective doing, project planning or other forms
indicative of concerted action should foster the perception of the
group as agentic and allure people especially in times of personal
threat.
In view of political extremism, deprivation of personal control
may be added as another motivational determinant, in addition
to self-uncertainty (Hogg, 2014), for engagement in political
extremist groups that particularly consist of ideological or
religious zealots that pursue group goals in a vigorous and
tough-minded manner. Radicalized groups not only provide
their members with a sense of a clear and distinct self that helps
to reduce their self-uncertainty (Hogg, 2014) but in addition,
radicalized groups can provide a sense of collective agency
that helps to restore their sense of control. Violent extremist
groups may stress their agency when they violate all norms of
human co-existence as this highlights absolute commitment to
a shared superordinate goal (it is even worth to violate all rules
of conduct), free decision (against “social desirability” concerns),
and the strength of active goal pursuit (which obviously cannot
be prevented by others although they should be extremely
motivated to stop the violations). These days, the rapid surge of
extremist groups that attract foreigners from different countries
who want to fight zealously for an “Islamic State” illustrates
nicely the agentic potential these extremist and inhuman groups
could offer. Personal feelings of lacking control may be one
motivational factor that helps to explain why such vigorous
campaigns gain support and new followers.
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